Could it be about Marx applying the 'Logic of Essence' where Hegel applies the 'Logic of Being'?7 In this case, the inversion would only have a partial char acter, as if it could be said that Hegel's logic uses arms where it should use legs. But the problem pointed out by Marx is that Hegel's method is inverted from head to toe.
Could the change in form mean proceeding from a general logical structure to one particularly appropriate to its object? In an early stage of the develop ment of his thought, Marx asserted:
However, this comprehension [Begreifen] does not, as Hegel thinks, con sist in everywhere recognizing the determinations of the logical concept [des logiscken Begriffs], but rather in grasping the proper logic of the proper object.8 Do we thus reach the answer by resorting to a logic that starts from the sim plest category which represents the proper object and makes this category develop itself through its own movement, so as to engender a more complex category, and so on, until an integral system of categories which belong to the proper object is completed? For example, is it about the development of the concept of the commodity engendering the concept of money, and the devel opment of the latter engendering the concept of capital, and so on?9 Marx himself rejects the idealist inversion inherent in such a procedure:
Apply this method to the categories of political economy and you have the logic and metaphysics of political economy . . . which makes them look as if they had newly blossomed forth in an intellect of pure reason; so much do these categories seem to engender one another, to be linked up and intertwined with one another by the very working of the dialectic movement.10
Moreover, Marx criticises himself with regard to the risk of letting the form of presentation generate the appearance that his research has fallen into this sort of idealist inversion:
The product becomes a commodity; the commodity becomes exchange value; the exchange value of the commodity is its immanent 6 6 CARRERA money-property; this, its money-property, separates itself from it in the form of m oney... It will be necessary later... to correct the idealist man ner of the presentation, which makes it seem as if it were merely a matter of conceptual determinations and of the dialectic of these concepts.11
It happens that logic is a constructive necessity produced by thought, whose movement as such is alien to the movement of the necessity that determines the object. Marx develops, apropos of Proudhon, the unavoidable contradic tion implied by any attempt to follow in thought, at the same time, the neces sity taken from reality and a logical-constructive necessity:
When M. Proudhon spoke of the series in the understanding, of the Logical sequence o f categories, he declared positively that he did not want to give history according to the order in time . . . Thus for him everything hap pened in the pure ether o f reason. Everything was to be derived from this ether by means of dialectics. Now that he has to put this dialectics into practice, his reason is in default... [N]ow we have M. Proudhon reduced to saying that the order in which he gives the economic categories is no longer the order in which they engender one another. The problem with logic, whatever its alleged degree of generality or singularity, resides in its exteriority with respect to the real necessity. Every logical repre sentation rules its path based on the substitution of the real necessity by a constructive necessity that appears as bearing the power to put thought into motion:
Logic -mind's coin o f the realm, the speculative or mental value of man and nature -its essence which has grown totally indifferent to all real determinateness and hence unreal -is alienated thinking, and therefore thinking which abstracts from nature and from real man: abstract thinking.13
Once again, what is the point? Let us address the question by reproducing the paths followed by Hegel and Marx as they present the unfolding of their methods.
2
Hegel's Idealistic Construction of 'Pure Knowledge' Which Immediately is 'Fulfilled Being'
Hegel recognises that scientific knowledge, as the 'science of manifested spirit' , starts from 'empirical, sensuous consciousness' , an 'immediate knowledge' , therefore, a knowledge which emerges from practice.14 But Hegel idealistically inverts the fact that knowledge is always knowledge of one's subjectivity with respect to the object upon which one is going to act. Instead of facing the question of knowledge as the discovery, by the subject, of the necessity of its action regarding the potentiality of the object, he inverts the question into that of the re-establishment of the identity between the sub jective process of knowing and the objective determination of the potentiality, where the former engenders the latter. He thus represents immediate knowl edge as pertaining to a subjectivity which confronts itself from its own exteri ority, since it is not capable of recognising the object as its own self-realisation. It deals with a subjectivity whose limitation in determining the object resides in that which is not developed even in its self-consciousness as the determinant of the object, in the fact that it does not recognise itself as a determinant.
Consequently, for Hegel, the overcoming of immediate cognition does not consist in the deepening of knowledge of the determinations of the subject and of those of the object, but rather the point is to abstract the movement of knowledge itself, since this movement itself has engendered subjectivity as well as its realisation as objectivity. Therefore, immediate knowledge is not fol lowed by the discovery of the content which determines the necessity of the subject and of the object, by penetrating into this content. For Hegel, the point is simply to penetrate the 'significance ... of immediate knowledge' itself.15
Thus, the veiy forms of the subject's consciousness, already emptied of their historical determinations by having been abstracted from the object of their action,16 become inverted as if they were the pure object of knowledge which in its movement engenders the consciousness:
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Consequently, free consciousness that bears the alienation in the commodity -this being the historically specific determination of Hegel's own consciousness -is raised to an abstractly free consciousness.
6 8 CARRERA Spirit. . . has shown itself to us to be . .. this movement of the Self which empties itself of itself and links itself into its substance, and also, as Subject, has gone out of that substance into itself, making the substance into an object and a content at the same time as it cancels this difference between objectivity and content. That first reflection out of immediacy is the Subject's differentiation of itself from its substance, or the Notion's separation of itself from itself, the withdrawal into itself and the becom ing the pure T.17
The phenomenology of spirit culminates in 'pure knowledge', 'the Notion of science', which is the 'absolute truth of consciousness'.18 Upon reaching this point, in which the forms of consciousness have been elevated to the condition of being the pure object of themselves, Hegel considers that 'in absolute know ing . . . the separation of the object from the certainty o f itself is completely eliminated; truth is now equated with certainty and this certainty with truth' .19 Since for Ilegel consciousness has thus overcome 'the difference between knowledge and truth',20 2 1 2 2 'pure science ... contains thought in sofar as this isjust as much the object in its own self or the object in its own self in so fa r as it is equally pure thought?1 And since 'pure knowing as concentrated into this unity [certainty which has become truth] hassublated all reference to an other and to mediation ... this simple immediacy, therefore, in its true expression is pure being '? 2 Thus Hegel arrives at the point of departure of the Logic, which is 'pure sci ence, that is, pure knowledge in the entire range of its development'.23 Once this development has been unfolded: Thus then logic, too, in the absolute Idea... is the Idea that has reached... a likeness corresponding to itself. The method is the pure Notion that relates itself only to itself; it is therefore the simple self relation that is being. But now it is also fulfilled being, the Notion that comprehends itself, being as the concrete and also absolutely intensive totality.24 The relationship that the subject of the action establishes with his/her object by ideally appropriating his/her own potentiality with respect to the object's potentiality in order to transform it, namely, the capacity of the human subject to organise his/her conscious action, appears here completely inverted. Hegel represents it as if it were a particular concrete form of an impersonal rational ity, of a self-consciousness, which does not arise from human subjectivity, but, conversely, determines it. Mere, freedom is not a historically determined social relation whose development is borne in the development of human subjectiv ity as it objectively advances in knowing its own transforming powers, and therefore transcending itself. Quite the opposite: Hegel idealistically inverts freedom, creating the appearance that it constitutes the attribute of a selfconsciousness that only relates to itself in the complete impossibility of tran scending its own identity:
The Idea, namely, in positing itself as the absolute unity of the pure Notion and its reality and thus contracting itself into the immediacy of being, is the totality in this form -nature. But this determination has not issuedfrom a process o f becoming, nor is it a transition, as when above, the subjective Notion in its totality becomes objectivity, and the subjective end becomes life. On the contrary, the pure Idea in which the determinateness or reality of the Notion is itself raised into Notion, is an absolute libera tion for which there is no longer any immediate determination that is not equally posited and itself Notion; in this freedom, therefore, no transition takes place.25
What is the concrete reality of this freedom? It is but each and all of the con crete forms of the social relation in the capitalist mode of production -private property, value, contracts, right, fraud, morality, ethics, family, justice, guilt, police, state, and so on -conceived as forms inherent by nature in human sub jectivity by grace of the self-conscious Idea.26 Thus:
The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea . . . the actuality of concrete freedom . . . The principle of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its cul mination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity, and yet 
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CARRERA at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself.27
The complete realisation of Hegel's Idea is but the cultivation of the appar ently limitless reproduction of the capitalist mode of production with all of its contradictions overcome. Impersonal reason, having outside itself neither a base on which it can pose itself, nor an object to which it can oppose itself, nor a subject with which it can compose itself, is forced to turn head over heels, in posing itself, opposing itself and composing itself. . . If we abstract thus from every subject all the alleged accidents, animate or inanimate, men or things, we are right in saying that in the final abstraction, the only sub stance left is the logical categories... [0]ne has only to make an abstrac tion of every characteristic distinctive of different movements to attain movement in its abstract condition -purely formal movement, the purely logical formula of movement. If one finds in logical categories the substance of all things, one imagines one has found in the logical formula of movement the absolute method, which not only explains all things, but also implies the movement of things ... All things being reduced to a logical category, and every movement, every act of production, to method, it follows naturally that every aggregate of products and production, of objects and of movement, can be reduced to a form of applied metaphysics . . . So what is this absolute method? .. . The purely logical form of movement or the movement of pure reason . . . Up to now we have exposed only the dialectics of Hegel.28
Next, he observes, 'Hegel has no problems to formulate. He has only dialectics... had already set his own problem: 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it'.30 This problem places us immediately in the held of action. And the first step in the very realisation of action corresponds to its organisation. How could action be organised through a consciousness that goes beyond the interpreta tion of reality, other than by questioning oneself about the objective potential ity of one's action and, therefore, about this action's necessity? That is, the point is now to answer oneself about the potentiality of one's action vis-a-vis the potentiality of its object, namely, about the determination of one's subjec tivity as the necessary concrete form of realising the potentiality of the object upon which action is to be taken.
Marx faces for the first time the problem he has posited by reproducing Hegel's course and, consequently, with the perspective that the movement of social life should be explained starting from the movement of the state. Therefore, the overcoming of the barriers to the reproduction of social life should arise from the realisation of the state's ought-to-be. However, just as Marx addresses the practice of such reproduction, he finds that there is a supe rior social power that imposes upon this assumed ought-to-be, namely, private interest:
[T]he Assembly degrades the executive power, the administrative author ities, the life of the accused, the idea of the state, crime itself, and punish ment as well, to material means o f private interest. . . [which means to] solve each material problem in a non-political way, i.e., without any con nection with the whole of the reason and morality of the state.31
If the state, and even its idea, are but material means of private interest, is political freedom not then a form of this same private interest? How could the state be the subject which is the bearer of human freedom if the political free dom which constitutes it has private interest as its content? Finally, how is it possible to advance, acting politically in a rational manner, without beginning to respond with regard to the necessity of private interest?
At the point where Hegel's abstraction found an answer by resorting to the state as 'the actuality of the ethical Idea' , thus bringing down all antagonism to an insufficient development of that Idea in its historical course, Marx's analy sis finds a question, namely, the question about the necessity of the subordina tion of the state, of politics, to private interest. Therefore, Marx seeks to find the necessity of private interest where it manifests itself in an immediate man ner, where the lack of all generic unity represented by the state seems to pre vail, that is, in 'civil society', whose quality is that 'the only bond between men is natural necessity'.32 The question is now about the organisation of the pro cess in which human beings satisfy their natural needs, whose point of depar ture is the organisation of the process of social production.33 Fifteen years after setting his problem, Marx synthesised the path followed by his analysis:
My inquiry led me to the conclusion that neither legal relations nor polit ical forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel... embraces within the term 'civil society'; that the anatomy of this civil society, however, has to be sought in political economy.34
Now, the analysis faces the categories of political economy. But as soon as these categories are questioned concerning their necessity, they show that: the commodity the simplest real concrete in which the historically specific character of the alienated organisation of social production is manifested. With this, he recognises the commodity as the concrete from which the repro duction in thought of the determinations of the subjectivity able to supersede the capitalist mode of production must necessarily begin:
In the hrst place, I do not start out from 'concepts', hence I do not start from the 'concept of value'... What I start out from is the simplest social form in which the labour-product is presented in contemporary society, and this is 'the commodity'.37
From the Grundrisse to A Contribution and Capital Marx makes here a defini tive step forward in putting dialectics on its feet: in the same way that in biol ogy it is clear that the cell from which one departs is a real concrete and not a concept or a categoiy, the commodity, namely, 'the economic cell-form [in bourgeois society]' ,38 is equally so.
3.2
The Dialectical Reproduction o f the Concrete Marx presents the point of departure of the dialectical development by stat ing, The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as "an immense accumulation of commodities", its unit being a single commodity.'39
On confronting the commodity as a real concrete and not as a category or a concept, the first knowledge of it could enter an exposition only as a simple immediate knowledge, that is, as the simple observation of a fact for whose necessity the very point of departure cannot account. The supersession of Hegel's inversion is already manifested here in a twofold manner. Against Hegel's abstract 'pure knowledge' , we have here the modest determined con crete being of the commodity and the modest immediate knowledge which has not gone beyond the appearance presented by social wealth in capitalist society. Moreover, the same supersession is expressed in the unity itself between knowledge and being: here, the existence of the commodity obliges thought to get into motion from its exterior, far from that 'pure knowledge' from whose immediateness 'pure being' emerged. At the same time, this point of departure is empty of any concept able to be placed in motion, either by imposing upon it a given logical structure, or by expecting that it can get into motion by itself as a consequence of its proper logic. To overcome its immediateness, knowledge needs to confront analytically the commodity in its reality, in search of the necessity that gives it its character as that simplest social form. The point is to confront the commodity in its real existence, in order to analyse it with the purpose of discovering why it presents the peculiar social property of being a use-value that bears the unnatural power of being an exchange-value. Marx performs this analysis, thus discover ing that this attribute of the commodity, its value, emerges from its being a materialisation of a labour which appears to lack any specific quality. He raises the question about the necessity of this labour as the determinant of value, a question which can only be answered by analysing this same labour. He thus discovers that the labour represented as the value of commodities embodies a material quality, that of being a productive physiological expenditure of the human body, and a social quality, that of being that physiological expenditure applied to the production of use-values for other individuals, of social use-val ues, which has been governed in its application by a private consciousness and independently of those individuals.
Thus, the analysis discovers socially necessary abstract labour, performed in a private and independent manner, to be the human activity that provides the commodity with its exchangeability, with its value. Nevertheless, it cannot answer the question of why this materialised labour represents itself in such a way. The only place where thought can objectively examine the manifestation of this necessity is where this necessity realises itself. Therefore, unless one attempts to force a logical movement upon the object, the only path opened to dialectical knowledge is to reproduce by means of thought the movement through which the commodity expresses its value in reality, that is, to follow ideally the commodity in the practical expression of its value in the process of exchange. How is this possible? Firstly, to say that the commodity has an attribute -namely, its capacity to be exchanged -is the same as saying that it has a potentiality to be realised. Therefore, its real determination is its affirma tion as this realised potentiality, or in other words, its negation as that same to-be-realised potentiality. Its determination is the affirmation of its attribute through its own negation. Secondly, thought is the subject's capacity virtually to appropriate his/her own potentiality with respect to the potentiality of its object. Thought thus confronts the real commodity and realises its own deter mination; that is, it affirms itself as a subjectivity that knows, negating itself as a subjectivity that bears knowledge as a potentiality yet to be realised. Now, it becomes apparent that although the value of a commodity is a quan tity of socially necessary abstract labour, it necessarily takes the form of a cer tain quantity of another privately produced use-value. That is, in the capitalist mode of production, social labour only manifests itself in the form of a thing that relates mutually independent producers with each other. At the moment they act as individual organs of social labour, that is, at the moment they orga nise their social labour, commodity-producers do not appear to be related between themselves, beyond each of them being the bearer of an individual portion of society's total labour-power. However, they do not bear this portion as the capacity to perform a certain concrete labour already determined by the same organisation of social labour, but in so far as it concerns their capacity to perform labour in general, to expend productively their body in general. Then, each one decides, according to his/her own consciousness and will, namely, in a private and independent manner, in which concrete useful form he/she expends his/her labour-power. Each one thus affirms him/herself as a subject free from all personal dependency with respect to those for whom he/she works.
Nevertheless, the recognition of his/her labour as socially useful is not an attribute that belongs to him/her, but a private attribute of eveiybody else's will. The capacity to recognise the social character of the labour performed by each one is an attribute inherent to the others, and only once the same labour has been materialised in its product. Therefore, this mutual recognition is established through the equalisation of those products in exchange as materi alisations of that sole social relation that existed between their producers at the moment in which each of them had to give, in a private and independent manner, a concrete form to his/her capacity to perform labour in general. Provided this generic labour-power has been appropriately applied, that is to say, provided abstract labour has been materialised in a socially useful con crete form, the materiality of that same labour is represented as the social attri bute borne by its product to relate, in exchange, with another which bears the same materialisation. That is, the materiality of socially necessary abstract labour is represented as the value of its product, and this product presents its specific social determination as a commodity. This is the indirect form in which the material unity of social production organised in a private and inde pendent manner imposes itself. The value-form taken by commodities is the general social relation that the private independent producers establish between themselves in an indirect manner.
Given that he/she performs his/her labour in a private and independent manner, the commodity-producer fully controls its individual character, and therefore affirms himself/herself as an individual free from any relationship of personal dependence. However, at the same time, he/she lacks any control over his/her labour's social character. The powers of his/her own individual labour with respect to the unity of the process of social metabolism completely 76 CARRERA escape his/her control. Consequently, he/she has to submit his/her conscious ness and will (which is inherent in a free individual) to the social powers borne by the product of his/her labour. Value, and therefore his/her capacity to take part in the organisation of social labour, and then in social consumption, is not his/her personal attribute. It is an attribute alien to his/her person; it belongs to his/her commodity. The material product of the labour that the conscious ness and will of his/hers that is inherent in a free individual have governed confronts him/her as the bearer of a social power that is alien to him/her and to which his/her consciousness and will are submitted. Therefore, the free con sciousness and will of commodity-producers are the form in which the alien ation of their consciousness and will as attributes of commodities is realised. Their free consciousness is the form taken by their alienated consciousness. Thus, they behave towards the commodity in a fetishistic way.
Starting from the movement of the commodity, we discover alienated con sciousness. However, we have not made this discovery by logically developing the category 'commodity' , but by reproducing through thought the real move ment of commodities. Now, the fact that this alienated consciousness is the one which the commodity-producer employs to govern his/her participation in his/her production confronts us with the following evidence: just as our point of departure was that 'immense accumulation of commodities' , alien ated consciousness was already present in its realisation at the point of depar ture itself. Moreover, consciousness is the form in which human subjects bear their capacity to govern their individual labour as organs of social labour. Therefore, regarding commodity-producers, we see that their capacity to gov ern their individual labour is an attribute that fully concerns their conscious ness and will. Nevertheless, at the same time, they lack any control over the social character of their labour. This control is an attribute objectified in the commodity. Therefore, when commodity-producers look at the movement of their own product, what confronts them is the movement of their alienated capacity to govern their social labour. We can then say that, in both A Contribution and Capital, the point of departure is the specific historical form presented to the subjects of action by their own consciousness in the capitalist mode of production. However, it would have been impossible to begin abstractly from the consciousness itself of commodity-producers, in order to discover free consciousness as the form of alienated consciousness. It is impos sible to discover objectively the fetishism of commodities without discovering, first, the specific form in which social labour is organised, which is the produc tion of commodities. Here, the social relation takes form in the consciousness and will of its subjects, and not vice versa.
In addition, let us notice that what confronts us here is not the abstract con sciousness of an abstract commodity-producer. Actually, it is the very con sciousness which has achieved this discoveiy, namely, itisourown consciousness. Its power to produce the said discoveiy, and therefore the development of its freedom, is but an expression of the development of its alienation.
Let us continue following the movement of the commodity. The same devel opment of the form of value makes it evident that, even though the general social relation appears to arise a posteriori from the material process of pro duction, the organisation of this process requires that one commodity in par ticular becomes placed apart by the movement of the rest, to act as the socially recognised substantive expression of social labour performed in a private and independent manner. The generalised production of commodities, which makes social wealth appear as an immense accumulation of commodities, implies the developed existence of money. Therefore, the point is not that the commodity has become money, or that the category 'commodity' has engen dered the categoiy 'money', by following a logical necessity. The point is that the movement of commodities, namely, the movement of the simplest specific concrete, has placed us in front of the real necessity that determines the exis tence of money as that objectified expression.
The realisation of commodities as values takes us from production to circu lation. When we confronted production, we discovered commodity-producers to be individuals free from any personal dependence who socially relate them selves in an indirect way through commodity-exchange, which operates behind their backs, thus determining their consciousness and will as alienated. Now, in circulation, we see that that indirect relation takes the concrete form of a direct relation, a conscious and voluntary one, as personifications of commod ities. Thus we discover that the indirect relation between persons, that is, the economic relation, realises its necessity under the form of a direct relation between personifications, that is, as a juridical relation.
Once again, the accumulation of commodities from which we departed was already mediated in its existence by the juridical relations between commodityowners, but we were unable to account for these relations at that point. Therefore, those who attempt to start by erasing the specificity of commodities as the social representation of the materiality of socially useful abstract labour performed privately are unable to go beyond the representation of the rela tionship that exists between economic relations and juridical relations as an external one. Since juridical relations appear to emerge from the will of mutu ally independent individuals, these conceptions fall victim to the appearance that human beings are abstractly free subjects by nature. From this follows the appearance that alienation is externally imposed upon this nature, thus 7« CARRERA hindering the recognition of alienation as the content of freedom, and thus the recognition of freedom as a historical social relation.
When we continue by following with our thought the real movement of commodities in circulation, we come to face the concrete form in which the unity between social production and consumption is established. At the stage where we had completed the first development of the form of value, we knew that the only possibility for this unity was the exchange of commodities in the exact proportion in which they were materialisations of the same quantity of socially necessary abstract labour. Now we discover that this determination affirms itself by taking a concrete form that appears as its own negation: those commodities whose production exceeds or falls short, vis-a-vis the amount of the solvent social necessity for them at their value, retain their capacity to enter the exchange-relation. But they do so by representing a greater or lesser amount of social labour than the socially necessaiy one which they actually embody. That is, the realisation of the values of commodities takes concrete shape, in competition, through the selling of commodities above or beneath their values.
Again, the point here is not that the category 'commodity' has logically engendered the categoiy 'competition'. Nor is it the case that we have started by abstracting the commodity from the contingencies of competition, by con structively introducing the simplifying assumption of the immediate realisa tion of value, and that we are now lifting this assumption. However, the point is also not that the commodity we came to know at first carried in itself, as a latent potentiality, the necessity of engendering the movement of competi tion. On the contraiy, as the elementary form of the initial accumulation of commodities, it was the full expression of the realisation of all the concrete determinations of competition. But it was impossible at that stage for us to apprehend it as such with our thought. Only by beginning with the commodity as the simplest specific concrete could we come completely to appropriate its determination as a full concrete.
As soon as the movement of commodities in circulation demands that we account for its concrete form as competition, we advance another step in rec ognising the determinations of the consciousness and will of personifications. All the direct relations that they establish in the organisation of social life nec essarily have an antagonistic character.
The movement of money as a means of circulation synthesises the determi nations of commodities that we have developed thus far. C -M -C: in order to satisfy their human needs by purchasing commodities which bear use-value for them, commodity-producers must have first appropriately acted as alien ated personifications in the production and realisation of value. This is a pro duction of use-values whose condition lies in the production of value. Therefore, the objective of the circuit remains beyond it. But when we ideally follow the movement of money, we find out that the very form of this move ment confronts us with the functions of money as hoard and as means of pay ment. Here, commodity-production has as its immediate aim the production of the objectified general social relation: both circuits end in money.
However, the production of the general social relation is, above all, the pro duction of the capacity to open the circuit of the process of social metabolism, that is, the production of the capacity to put into motion individual labours as organs of social labour. Thus, the reproduction by means of thought of the movement of money faces us with the movement of the objectified general social relation, which opens the circuit of production of commodities with the immediate aim of producing more of itself: M -C -M'. Now we recognise the general social relation as capital, that is, as the capacity to put social labour into motion with the immediate aim of producing more of this same capacity. The reason for this circuit resides within the circuit itself. This is a modality of organising the process of social metabolism which has its self-multiplication as its immediate aim. Therefore, this is a social relation that acts as the imme diate subject of social production, namely, an automatic organisation of social production. The consciousness and will of the individuals are concrete forms that embody the realisation of this organisation, which as such confronts them as an alien power that dominates them.
We thus discover that commodity-production, from whose simplest con crete expression we departed, is not a production of use-values mediated by the production of value. We recognise this determination now as an appear ance. Commodity-production has the valorisation of capital as its immediate aim, and use-values for human life are produced only provided that surplusvalue is produced. It is not about the category 'commodity' engendering the category 'capital'. On the contrary, we are now able to recognise that the sim plest concrete from which we departed, the commodity, is the product of capital.
At the stage where we recognised the commodity as the simplest concrete presented by the capitalist mode of production, it appeared that no general social relation pre-existed the private decision about the concrete form in which each producer would expend his/her individual portion of society's labour-power. The general social relation only appeared to emerge from pri vate production, ruled by these decisions; so this alienated social relation appeared, then, as the one which determined the consciousness of the com modity-producers, in the form of the necessity to produce value. Now it becomes evident that the objectified social relation pre-existed the putting 8o CARRERA into action of social labour in a private manner, and that the will of the capital ist, as the personification of capital, is but the concrete form under which this modality of organising social production realises its necessity.
Had we stopped before reaching this point, we would have fallen victim to an appearance which was the inverse of the true content. It would have been impossible for us to discover that the commodity from which we departed is not the simple product of labour, but the product of a labour alienated to capi tal. Nevertheless, we now recognise the true concrete determination, only because we departed from the commodity as that simplest concrete which confronted us in its immediateness.
As the substantive form of the general social relation, money acting as capi tal starts by recognising as socially necessaiy the labour privately materialised in two types of commodities, namely, labour-power and means of production. Then, the labour-power is transformed into living labour, which becomes materialised in a private and independent manner in a new commodity, which in turn is transformed into money, as it is recognised in circulation as a materi alisation of socially necessaiy abstract labour.
When we faced the commodity for the first time, private ownership of one's means of production appeared to be necessary in order to produce it. Now, from a more developed concrete point of view, we see that the content is the opposite one: the worker sells his/her labour-power because, as a free individ ual, he/she is separated from his/her means of production. Workers are free individuals in a double sense. Freedom, which we knew to be the form of the alienation in commodities, shows through its real movement that, actually, it is the form of the alienation in capital.
It is not about the category 'capital' engendering the categoiy 'commodity labour-power' , and even less so about constructing a category 'capital' which satisfies the requirement of treating labour-power as a commodity. What we have done is to reproduce in thought the fact that the general social relation proper to the capitalist mode of production puts itself into motion by deter mining the worker's capacity to work as its own product.
By thus following the movement of capital, we discover that the true con tent enclosed by the exchange of commodities as equivalent materialisations of social labour implies that the worker is forced to render more social labour than that materialised in the means of subsistence he/she receives in exchange. That is, the exchange of equivalents is the form taken by the exploitation of the worker by capital.
Initially, when we discovered the commodity as the objectified form of the general social relation in the capitalist mode of production, it appeared that, on the one hand, the direct producer had complete control over his/her indi vidual labour while, on the other hand, no direct control existed over the social character of labour. We can now see that, on the one hand, the direct producer of commodities, the worker, remains a free individual although he/she does not have complete control over his/her individual labour. As this free individ ual, he/she must obey the authority of the capitalist who has purchased his/ her labour-power. On the other hand, the capitalist directly controls the work er's labour, thus controlling a social labour, albeit in a private way. Then, just at this stage of reproducing the movement of the general social relation, we are able to recognise the commodity from which we departed as the product of a certain direct organisation -therefore conscious and voluntary -of social labour. We thus discover that private labour is not merely such, but a contra diction in itself: private labour socially organised within itself.
As an objectified social relation that immediately aims at producing more of itself, capital realises its determination by lengthening the working day. However, this, its very movement, confronts us with the negation of its own reproduction, in so far as the lengthening of the working day undermines the reproduction of labour-power. When we follow the development of this con tradiction, we find that its first pole simply reproduces the antagonistic rela tionship between the workers as sellers of the same commodity, namely, the competition among themselves. On the contrary, the second pole causes this competition to take the concrete shape of its opposite, namely, solidarity as the normal form of selling labour-power at its value.
Thus far, it appeared that the owners of commodities were only able to relate directly with each other as personifications on an individual basis, namely, juridical relations could not go beyond private ones. But after follow ing the movement of capital, we discover that the antagonistic relations between personifications necessarily have a public character, namely, a politi cal character, in so far as the universe of the sellers of labour-power confronts the universe of its purchasers. In this confrontation, the former determine themselves as the working class and the latter as the capitalist class. That is, the indirect organisation of social labour through the valorisation of capital has class-struggle as its necessary concrete form. In other words, in the capitalist mode of production, the political action of social classes is the concrete form taken by capital-valorisation. In turn, the concrete forms of class-struggle con front us with the determination of the state as the political representative of the totality of the individual capitals of society. Now, this concrete form taken by the buying and selling of labour-power confronts us with the fact that, where the independent action of individual capitals as the subjects of valorisation appeared to be the only possible unity within the process of social metabolism, these are not the actual subjects of 82 CARRERA the said unity. In a concrete manner, total social capital is the subject of that unity. Therefore, the very alienated subject of this mode of organising the pro cess of social metabolism is the unity of its self-reproduction.
The contradiction between a limited working day and capital's valorisation confronts us with the production of relative surplus-value. In it, the apparently independent movement of each individual capital in pursuit of an extraordi nary surplus-value, achieved by developing the productivity of its workers, results in the reduction of the value of the workers' means of subsistence, and therefore the reduction of the value of labour-power and, finally, the increase of the rate of surplus-value.
Let us follow the movement of capital into the production of relative surplus-value and leap forward, for reasons of brevity, to its most powerful form: the system of machinery of large-scale industry. Now, we are able to rec ognise that the commodity from which we departed was the concrete realised form of very different determinations from those we were able to discover in it as the simplest specific concrete. As that simplest concrete, we knew it as the product of a free individual, who as such exerted complete control over his/her individual labour but lacked any control over its social character, so he/she had to alienate his/her consciousness to the social powers of the product of his/her labour, or, in other words, he/she had to produce value. The development of capital as the subject of the production of relative surplus-value shows us now, firstly, that the commodity from which we departed concretely is the product of the labour of a collective of doubly-free individuals. Secondly, this collective worker consciously governs the labour of its individual organs by means of a production-plan elaborated by an objective, namely scientific, consciousness. Therefore, the collective worker acts with complete control over the unity of its labour as a private organ of social production. However, it lacks any control over the general social character of its labour. Consequently, it has to alienate its consciousness in the service of the social powers of the product of its labour, that is, it has to produce surplus-value.40
Thus far, we have followed capital along the complete movement of its cir cuit of valorisation, that is to say, along the process within which surplus-value emerges from capital. The only movement that capital presents us, beyond this circuit, is the reproduction of this same circuit. As we follow this reproduction, we are confronted by three contents that appeared inverted in the buying and selling of labour-power in circulation, beyond the exchange of equivalents as the necessary form of exploitation. Firstly, under the form of the worker's free dom, he/she is a forced labourer for total social capital. Secondly, under the consumption. In this mode of production, the organisation of social labour within each unit of production is an attribute that privately pertains to it. Conversely, each productive unit lacks control over the general social charac ter of the labour it performs. Social labour is organised in a private and inde pendent way. The unity between social production and consumption is thus established in an indirect manner. The capacity to privately organise social labour operates as an attribute materialised in the product of the same labour. At the same time, the immediate aim that rules the putting into action of social labour is not the production of social use-values, but the expanded reproduc tion of the same objectified capacity to put into action social labour in a pri vate manner. The objectified social relation is the one that puts into action social labour in order to produce more of itself. Such is capital's essential determination. Again, consciousness is, above all, the capacity of human subjects to rule their own individual labour as organs of social labour. However, in the capital ist mode of production, this power confronts its subjects as a power that belongs to the material product of their social labour. That is, the determina tion proper of the subjects' consciousness confronts their consciousness itself as a power located beyond it, as an autonomised capacity to put into action social labour which their consciousness itself must obey, that is, of which con sciousness must act as a concrete form of realisation. As such, the said autono mised capacity puts consciousness into movement. In reality, the movement of capital puts thought into movement, determining it as an alienated thought.
As a historical form of the development of the productive forces of social labour, capital determines a specific movement of consciousness. The specifi cally capitalist form of developing the productive forces of social labour con sists in the progressive socialisation of private labour. That is, it consists in the development of the capacity to organise social labour through the objective knowledge of one's own determinations, as a concrete form of the realisation of the development of the organisation of social labour as the negation of such objective knowledge. The development of the productive forces of immedi ately social free labour as an attribute of its very negation, namely, of private labour, is the contradiction that synthesises the historical potentialities and the absolute limit of the capitalist mode of production. And the transforma tion of the materiality of the labour in which the development of the said con tradiction takes concrete form (the production of relative surplus-value) determines the working class to be the subject whose action realises such development.
The capitalist social relation itself needs to engender this social subject, which produces its consciousness under the form in which eveiy constructive
